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I. THE PROBLEM OF FRAGMENTATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Fragmentation of international law, in the sense of competing nor-
mative orders, has recently received considerable attention.1 Neither
States nor other participants active in the process of the development of
international law appear to notice its fragmentation and even if they no-
tice, they do not appear to be overly concerned. To a great extent it is
these participants and States who knowingly or unknowingly promoted
or engaged in promoting the possibilities for such "fragmentation." The
fragmentation of international law became a matter of concern for dif-
ferent reasons. While I will briefly touch upon these reasons, the primary
* Member, International Law Commission, Additional Secretary and the Legal Adviser,
Ministry of External Affairs, India (Retired) and Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan
Law School (Fall 2003). The author is thankful to Srikanth Katragadda and Jason C. Nelson,
second year law students at the University of Michigan Law School, for their help in finalizing
this paper. The author is solely responsible for the views expressed therein.
1. For a review of some of the literature and concerns, see Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi
Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
553-79 (2002). See also Symposium, Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribu-
nals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999).
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focus of this presentation will be to examine whether the creation of
multiple international judicial forums, whose function is the interpreta-
tion and application of international law, are a source, or are likely to be
sources, of fragmentation of international law. The main thrust of this
presentation is to suggest that the creation of multiple international judi-
cial tribunals is a function of the ever-expanding nature of international
law and that the creation of such tribunals is a sign of the growing matur-
ity of international law. While it is admitted that these tribunals have to
be sensitive to the needs of promoting the unity and integrity of interna-
tional law, a brief look at the available evidence of their functioning so
far has revealed no cause for concern of fragmentation. I will look spe-
cifically at the working of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, primarily because its creation had elicited some stringent criticism
and concern in this respect. I will also refer to the dispute settlement un-
derstanding that governs the World Trade Organization Treaty system
and the ad hoc tribunals that are invested with the jurisdiction to try the
serious crimes committed during the conflict affecting the former territo-
ries of Yugoslavia.
Before I proceed one preliminary point needs to be made. Fragmen-
tation of international law presupposes some basic unity and integrity to
the structure of international law that governs international or transnational
relations. This unity and integrity attributes universality to the core content
of international law. Since the establishment of the (UN), all members of
the UN have been participating in the process of formation, development,
and application of international law. Thus we witness a truly universal par-
ticipation of all States in the decision-making of the international
conferences that conclude treaties on a variety of international law sub-
jects. But behind the facade of universal participation there is much that
does not meet the eye.2 The participation of developing countries is not
as effective as it ought to be for a variety of reasons. Their interests are
not as well-articulated or as united in the process of negotiation as their
counterparts from the more developed world. Developing nations also
appear to lack a certain focus on immediate priorities and the ability to
adopt appropriate strategies for achieving them. Whether in international
trade, the environment, or human rights, there is a divergence of ap-
proaches both in the formation of law and in its interpretation and
2. See for example the problem described by Ambassador Christopher W. Pinto faced by
the developing countries when they attend big multilateral conferences. He noted that they are
overwhelmed by the large contingent of specialists from the developed world who come well
prepared to these conferences with the most modem means of communications to contact and
up-to-date briefs from their capitals. C.W. Pinto, Modern Conference Technique: Insights from
Social Psychology and Anthropology, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 305, 315 (R. St. J. McDonald & D. M. Johnston eds., 1983).
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application among different States of the international community. Issues
concerning international peace and security and the fight against terror-
ism have opened up new gaps in the understanding and appreciation of
the existing law and on the ways and means of adjusting or reforming
the same to suit contemporary requirements. There are no credible op-
tions in the present world order to fight and progressively but effectively
eliminate growing global poverty and inequalities among nations and
peoples. The elimination of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear
weapons is not in sight in spite of the priorities attached to it since the
end of World War II. As a result, there is bound to be fragmentation in
the sense of divergent approaches in the manner in which international
law is sought to be interpreted and applied among different States and
regions of the world. This fragmentation is aggravated by competing
values and priorities not only among States but also among States on the
one hand and non-State entities on the other. But this matter is beyond
the compass of the present investigation and a new theme to be pursued
on its own.
As noted above, assuming a certain basic unity and integrity of in-
ternational law, several reasons may be cited for the fragmentation of
international law. It should be noted that the increased reliance on soft
law, that is, for example, on declarations of international conferences or
resolutions of the UN General Assembly, which are essentially of a rec-
ommendatory value as a basis for the articulation of rights and
obligations of States, could cause confusion about the normative value of
prescriptions in general. Soft law, which by definition is not related to
formal sources as prescribed under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)-conventions, custom, and general
principles-could be interpreted and applied differently by different
States; soft obligations do not entail common standards. Instead, soft
obligations are recommendatory in nature, and leave in some cases both
the level and the schedule of implementation to the discretion of States.
Often soft law may not provide for any international enforcement
mechanism. The result of such diversification of sources and the dilution
of the form and content of international law could be its fragmentation.
Associated with it is also the consequence that an obligation could be
imposed upon a State, despite its opposition or lack of consent.
Early warnings about fragmentation were given by Prosper Weil in
his much-debated essay on the relative normativity of international law.
Weil noted that a principle of international law becomes jus cogens, or
gets the status of peremptory norm, or becomes a principle whose viola-
tion is an international crime, not so much by virtue of the content of the
principle, but by the recognition accorded to it by the international
Summer 2004]
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community. Further, he pointed out that once recognized and accepted
by the "essential components of the international community" the super
norms would ipso jure be imposed on all States, including those who
were against that recognition. In comparison, according to international
law a State is not obliged to honor a treaty obligation it has not accepted
or customary law obligation it has persistently opposed . This dichotomy
in the invocation of international law obligations is for Weil a matter of
fragmentation of international law. He is also concerned about the legal
value often given to principles and declarations, as these become norma-
tive, even if they do not possess that legal value at the time of their
formation. He referred to these as "subnormative" acts. Weil registers his
concern thus:
One scarcely overemphasizes the uncertainties inflicted on the
international normative system by the fragmentation of norma-
tivity that the theories of jus cogens and international crimes
have brought in their wake. A normativity subject to unlimited
gradation is one doomed to flabbiness, one that in the end will
be reduced to a convenient term of art, covering a great variety
of realities difficult to grasp. Like the "variable legal authority"
of subnormative acts, the graduated normativity of normative
acts is a notion so elusive as to escape comprehension.
Ian Brownlie was also concerned about fragmentation resulting from
excessive compartmentalization of international law. He explained:
A related problem is the tendency to fragmentation of law,
which characterizes the enthusiastic legal literature. The as-
sumption is made that there are discrete subjects, such as
"international human rights law" or "international law on devel-
opment." As a consequence the quality and coherence of
international law as a whole is threatened. Thus, for example,
points are made as though they are novel propositions of human
rights law when in fact the point concerned had long been rec-
ognized in general international law.'
3. On the role of persistent objection in preventing the application of the customary
obligation against the persistent objector State, see T. Stein, The Approach of the Different
Drummer: the Principle of Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J.
457-482 (1985). See also, Jonathan Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Develop-
ment of Customary International Law, 1956 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1-24 (1985).
4. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L. L.
413,429 (1983).
5. Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 1, 15 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
[Vol. 25:929
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Bruno Simma touched on another aspect of fragmentation of interna-
tional law, relating to the tendency to excessively compartmentalize
international law branches into so-called "self-contained regimes." Ac-
cording to Simma, such regimes may have limited significance for
promoting a more harmonious development and implementation of in-
ternational obligations regulated thereunder by tailor-made procedures
for implementation and specification of consequences. These regimes
are welcomed to the extent that they are likely to insulate the rights and
obligations involved from the "the principles of autodetermination and
self-enforcement of rights and duties" 6 that "infect the international legal
process with elements of disorder and arbitrariness. However, he cau-
tioned that:
[W]hen one turns from an abstract discussion of the pros and
cons of "self-contained" regimes to the analysis of concrete
cases one has to recognize sooner or later that, beyond a certain
point, insistence upon further "self-containment" of specific le-
gal consequences can only have a negative effect on the
effectiveness of the primary rules concerned."8
Associated with the concept of self-contained regimes is the operation
of lex specialis. These are legal regimes more specific in content and thus
seen as differing from the more general category of law on the subject.9
Lex specialis may provide their own set of rights and obligations, and even
the consequences for failure to perform them. In that sense these regimes
could exclude the application of the general international law and State
responsibility for wrongful acts as provided thereunder. Diplomatic law,
international human rights law, international humanitarian law,
environmental law, and international trade law regulated by the WTO are
6. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, Self-contained Regimes, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 135
(1985).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 136.
9. The Latin maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali expresses the principle. It may
not be always easy to separate and identify the special from the general. For the principle to
operate and the lex specialis to prevail over the general, it is not enough to show that there is a
more particular obligation of a later date to override the more general obligation of an earlier
date applicable as between the parties to the dispute. It should also be shown that the two have
conflicting scope and content. The intention of the parties is material. If it is clearly expressed
as to which one should prevail in case of conflict that would take precedence over any other
rule of interpretation. See The Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 I. C .J. 38, para 24
(Feb. 24). For an analysis of the principle, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARY
306-308 (2002). The matter came up for consideration before the International Tribunal on
Law of the Sea in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases between New Zealand and Japan; Austra-
lia and Japan, Order of 27 August 1999, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los.
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some of the examples of lex specialis or self-contained regimes (there
could be some fine nuances between lex specialis and self-contained
regimes, but the latter is perhaps to be seen as a more developed and
complete form of lex specialis). "Objective regimes" similarly designate
a particularized set of rules for an area but not necessarily fully
disconnecting that regime from the general or other such regimes. For
example, proposals for nuclear free zones or peace zones fall into this
category.10
Fragmentation of international law is also feared if rights and obliga-
tions under any regime of international law are not uniform and are
varied for different groups of States. For instance, this scenario could
occur if different time frames and different standards of compliance are
prescribed under the rubric of the same obligation. In the environmental
and economic fields, as well as in disarmament and human rights areas,
different, varying, or multiple standards are quite prominent. In other
words, common but differentiated responsibilities could well be misrep-
resented or misunderstood as a threat to the unity and development of
universal international law."
Yet on another level, it is possible to argue that fragmentation could
result if obligations were to conflict with each other, given their relative
status or hierarchy in international law. For example, apart from prob-
lems posed by soft law, and problems of interpretation of international
agreements'2, treaty obligations could conflict with the obligations of the
parties under the UN Charter. However, in as much as States have ex-
pressly contracted away their right not to give effect to treaties that
would come into conflict with their obligations under the Charter per
Article 103, one may take the view that the implementation of that obli-
gation may not strictly be treated as an example of fragmentation.
Similarly, it is not easy to envisage a conflict between a jus cogens obli-
10. SURYA SUBEDI, LAND AND MARITIME ZONES OF PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1996).
11. The problem of double standards one for nuclear power States and the other for non-
nuclear States is the one that rendered the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons Treaty almost
ineffective in preventing further development and elimination of nuclear weapons. But this is
different from varying and modulating treaty obligations according to the stages of economic
development and capacity to implement treaty obligations with a view to achieve effective
implementation of treaty obligations in a realistic fashion. This objective is at the root of the
principle of common but differentiated obligations. See for an analysis of this principle, PHIL-
IPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 55-56 (2003) (accepted in
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration and for US views rejecting the principle of diminution of
obligations for the developing countries). See also PATRICIA BERNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 100-101 (2002).
12. For a discussion of problems posed by certain hierarchy of obligations in international
law involving "soft law" as well as treaty interpretation, see Dinah Shelton, International Law
and Relative Normativity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, 145, 146 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
[Vol. 25:929
Multiple International Judicial Forums
gation and an obligation erga omnes. The former is a principle that sets
out the peremptory character of the obligation usually cited for non-
derogability of obligations, while the latter denotes a wider standing
even for States not directly affected by a wrongful act involving an erga
omnes obligation to invoke State responsibility and seek appropriate
remedies.'3 One is a substantive principle of law and the other is an im-
portant principle of procedure. The two may be interconnected, but may
not necessarily come into conflict. Threats to the unity and integrity of
international law could also arise if different tribunals now in existence
at the international level were to decide differently on a particular sub-
ject matter. This point is said to be the case in at least two different
cases, referred to below.
Each of these reasons noted raises several important issues of their
own. Given the breadth and complexity of these issues, the International
Law Commission (Commission) requested Gerhard Hafner to present an
initial feasibility study." Following its consideration of the feasibility
study presented by Hafner, the Commission decided in 2000 to include
the topic of fragmentation of international law in its long-term program
of work. In his study, Hafner listed several causes and effects of such
fragmentation. Of the causes, Hafner identified the lack of centralized
organs that would ensure homogeneity and conformity of legal regula-
tions, specialization leading to topic autonomy, political division on
particular issues, differing legal structures, parallel regulations, competi-
tive regulations, enlargement of the material scope of international law,
multiplication of actors, and establishment of monitoring bodies and dif-
ferent regimes of secondary rules. The outcome was claimed to be a
threat to the reliability and credibility of international law.
Hafner's paper elicited considerable excitement and Commission
members were eager to pursue the subject, even though many of them
did not have the opportunity to give the matter the considerable reflec-
tion the topic merited. It was also not clear whether the Commission,
whose mandate is to codify and progressively develop international law,
would be within its mandate to take up this subject, which may not
strictly lend itself to such a task. However, given the importance of the
fragmentation topic to the unity and integrity of international law, the
relationship of the topic to the broad mandate of the Commission, and
the flexibility with which the Commission could discharge its mandate,
it was generally felt that the Commission would not only be within its
13. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 37.
14. Gerhard Hafner, Risks Ensuing From Fragmentation of International Law, Report of
the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Suppl. No.10, at 321, U.N. Doc.
A/55/10 (2000).
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mandate to study the topic, but by doing so, the Commission could make
a distinct contribution to clarify and put into perspective the conse-
quences and implications of the diversification and expansion of
international law. This feeling was also shared by the UN General As-
sembly (the Sixth Committee) when it considered the Report of the
Commission of 2001.
Accordingly, a study group under the Chairmanship of then Profes-
sor Bruno Simma considered the matter in 2002. It reached several
useful conclusions to delimit the nature and scope of the topic.'" First,
the group determined that the Commission's study should not focus on
the risks of fragmentation and the "too negative a light"'' 6 it puts on the
subject, but the study should focus on the difficulties posed by the diver-
sification and expansion of international law. It should not deal with
problems posed by the creation of multiple international judicial forums
and the need for coordination, but could consider the problems that may
arise from such divergences. The group also concluded that domestic
analogies were not helpful as "there was no well-developed and authori-
tative hierarchy of values in international law"" as well as "no hierarchy
of systems represented by a final body to resolve conflicts."'8 The Com-
mission determined that it could do well by not appointing itself as
referee "in the relationships between institutions, and in areas of con-
flicting rules."' 9 Further, it was considered useful to approach the study
of the fragmentation topic as an extension of its earlier work on the law
of State responsibility and the law of treaties. In this regard, several con-
crete issues were recommended for initial examination, such as the
function and scope of lex specialis and the question of self-contained
regimes. Additional issues that may be addressed in the future are the
application and modification of treaties and the hierarchy of norms in
international law. The Commission's study group made further progress
in 2003 under the Chairmanship of Professor Koskenneimi, by analyzing
the concept of lex specialis and the question of the self-contained re-
gime. °
Given the limited focus of my presentation, I will neither go into the
details of the consideration of the fragmentation topic by the Commis-
sion nor examine the different causes or factors considered responsible
15. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Suppl. No. 10,
at 237, 242, U.N. Doc. A/ 57/10 (2002).
16. Id. at 239.
17. Id. at 240.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Report of the International Commission, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Suppl. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/58/10, 269-275 (2003).
[Vol. 25:929
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for fragmentation. Instead, I will concentrate on one aspect of the prob-
lem: Is the creation of multiple international judicial tribunals
detrimental to the unity and integrity of international law?
Judge Oda, who was a prominent scholar on and a negotiator of the
law of the sea, questioned the creation of the International Tribunal for
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the problem of multiple judicial forums at
the international level before his election to the bench of the ICJ. In his
words:
The creation of a court of judicature in parallel with the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, which has been in existence for many
years as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, will
prove to have been a great mistake. One should not lose sight of
the fact that the law of the sea always has been, and always will
be, an integral part of international law as a whole. The law of
the sea must be interpreted in the light of the uniform develop-
ment of jurisprudence within the international community and
must not be dealt with in a fragmentary manner.... If the devel-
opment of the law of the sea were to be separated from the
general rules of international law and placed under the jurisdic-
tion of a separate judicial authority, this could lead to the
destruction of the very foundation of international law.2
However, Judge Oda pointed out the need for-and the value of-an
International Seabed Disputes Chamber (Chamber) to deal with certain
specific legal issues arising from the exploration and exploitation of the
international seabed area.22 The Chamber would have jurisdiction to de-
cide disputes involving States, the International Seabed Authority (ISA),
the Enterprise (a mining arm of the ISA), private contractors, individu-
als, and non-State entities. Judge Oda also favored special arbitral
tribunals to decide disputes concerning scientific research, marine pollu-
tion, and fisheries. These disputes might involve conflicts about the
exercise of the rights and the discretionary power given to the coastal
States in the exclusive economic zone in relation to the rights of other
States. These disputes would require a high level of expertise in their
respective fields. Moreover, the issues involved may be in the nature of
equity and not of law. Similarly, Judge Oda favored arbitration for the
settlement of maritime delimitation. In his view the problem of drawing
a maritime boundary on the basis of various "factors to be taken into
21. Shigeru Oda, Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea, 44 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 863, 864 (1995).
22. Id. at 867-71.
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consideration," the "special circumstances," or "relevant circumstances,"
that States plead "does not belong to the function of law.
' 23
Judge Gilbert Guillaume of the ICJ has also stressed the dangers of
fragmentation of international law as a result of multiple judicial forums.
He reviewed the role of ITLOS, international criminal courts, both ad
hoc and permanent tribunals, and arbitration as methods of dispute
settlement. While commending the contribution to creating peace and
good order that they all made within their limited sphere, he stressed the
"dangers for international law, resulting from the increasing number of
judicial institutions in the modem world." According to Judge Guillaume,
the risk of these different tribunals delivering divergent opinions on the
same point of international law was real and damaging to the unity of
international law.24 In his address to the Sixth Committee of the UN
General Assembly in 2000, in his capacity as the President of the ICJ,
Judge Guillaume emphasized this point25 and gave two examples where
different tribunals expressed divergent positions: the Loizidou case 6 and
the Tadic case.27 In the Loizidou case (1995) the European Court of
Human Rights declared the invalidity of territorial reservations attached
to Turkey's acceptance of the jurisdiction of that court.28 It is not clear
whether the decision of the European Court in invalidating Turkey's
territorial reservation to its jurisdiction can be treated as a real case of
conflict between the jurisprudence of that court and that of the ICJ. The
Statue of the ICJ would allow the type of territorial jurisdiction which was
invalidated by the European Court of Justice. But the position of the
European Court can be distinguished from that of the position of the ICJ
to similar reservations. The main difference is as the European Court
noted it was entrusted with "direct supervisory functions in respect of a
law-making treaty such as the [European] Convention." 29 1 will analyze
23. Id. at 869.
24. Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of International judicial Tribunals, 44 INT'L & COmP.
L.Q. 848, 861-862 (1995).
25. For a mention of the concern of President Guillaume before the UN General Assem-
bly, see Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 1, at 555.
26. Loizidou v Turkey, 20 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) No. 310 at 99 (1995).
27. Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber,
(July 15, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm [here-
inafter Tadic Appeal].
28. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 1, at 568. In addition this case also dealt with the
issue of attribution of responsibility to Turkey for acts committed by.contingents of Turkish
army placed on the terrirtory of northern Cyprus in defense of the self-proclaimed State of
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is not recognised by the international commu-
nity. For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see Andre J. J. DE Hoogh, Articles 4 and 8 of
the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the Tadic case and Attribution of Acts of Bos-
nian Serb Authorities to the Federal republic of Yugoslavia, 2001 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L., 255,
271-272.
29. Loizidou, supra note 26.
[Vol. 25:929
Multiple International Judicial Forums
the holding in the Tadic case (1999) decided by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) below, in the
context of our examination of the functioning of the international
criminal tribunals in the diverse system of international tribunals.
Judge Guillaume argued that a divergence of opinion between two
international tribunals showed that proliferation of tribunals was accom-
panied by "a serious risk: namely 'loss of control."' 30 He repeated his
concern in his address to the UN General Assembly in 2001 by stating
that the proliferation of international courts could jeopardize the unity of
international law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-State rela-
tions."'"
Other Presidents of the ICJ-Judge Schwebel and Judge Jennings-
also voiced similar concerns, though not as directly or as pointedly.
32
Judge Schwebel proposed that other international tribunals might seek an
advisory opinion from the ICJ "on issues of international law that arise
in cases before those tribunals that are of importance to the unity of in-
ternational law," as a possible solution.33 This suggestion was also made
by Judge Guillaume.34
One of the points that emerges from the concerns expressed by the
distinguished former presidents of the ICJ is that to the extent possible,
disputes under general international law, particularly those involving
only States, should continue to be addressed to the ICJ in the interest of
the unity and integrity of international law. This point raises an issue
about the nature of contemporary international law and policy governing
the creation of new tribunals, which are meant to decide disputes on the
basis of a legal regime set up by an international treaty. Thus, it is impor-
tant to consider the expanding nature of international law, a significant
phenomenon since the establishment of the UN in 1945.
II. THE EXPANDING CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EMERGENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNITY
International law is regarded as a body of principles expressly
agreed to by States. Under this definition, States enjoy freedom of action
in areas not so expressly regulated or prohibited. However, the scope and
structure of international law today is different, as it has been vastly
30. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 1, at 555.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 554.
34. Guillaume, supra note 24, at 862.
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expanded to accommodate obligations arising for States without or
against their will. Professor Tomuschat observed that:
[S]overeignty could be taken to mean, in the sense outlined by
the Lotus judgment of the PCIJ, that in the absence of any spe-
cific prohibitive rule each State is simply free to do whatever it
pleases to do. Such an understanding of sovereignty would be
the very denial of the existence of a legal community.35
The "legal community" is a short hand expression for the existence of
rights and obligations that a State is required to recognize and discharge
in its capacity as a member of the international community irrespective
of its consent or will to be bound by the same.
To illustrate, the decisions of the UN Security Council are binding
on all States, both members and non-members, by virtue of Article 25
when read in conjunction with article 2(6) of the UN Charter, in all mat-
ters concerning the maintenance of international peace and security.
Further, under Article 103 of the UN Charter, obligations undertaken by
member States override any other conflicting obligations existing or con-
tracted under other treaties. Given the constitutional character of the UN
Charter, the obligations Member States have accepted under the Charter
are relatively indeterminate in nature and could continuously evolve.
Hence, it may not be open any longer to States to claim that they are
bound only by those obligations that they have voluntarily accepted.
The General Assembly of the United Nations-a body of more than
189 States-is the most universally representative forum for the expres-
sion of the will of the international community. In that capacity, any
resolution that it passes with near unanimity, on any subject with a clear
intent, content, and concrete focus on rights and obligations of States, or
by way of clarification or elaboration of the various provisions of the
Charter, could be a source of lawful and binding obligation for States.
The fact that resolutions of the UN General Assembly are only recom-
mendatory in nature does not negate this proposition because such
resolutions can influence the crystallization of customary law. They can
also be the basis for negotiating more elaborate treaty regimes. In addi-
tion, as Pellet explained: "[A] recommendation for example: must be
"examined" bona fide by all the Member States or the Organization that
adopted it; narrows the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States; and
may be implemented by them. 36
35. Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will 241
(IV) RES. DES COURS, 198, 237 (1993).
36. Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-
Making, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 22, 31-32 (1992). In this Article, Professor Pellet presents a
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Further, he noted that: "[W]hen a State implements a recommenda-
tion, its international responsibility is not involved and, in turn, this
implies that recommendations are not binding, they are permissive. They
do not compel-they permit."37
Moreover, several resolutions of the UN General Assembly have
been regarded as inherently prescriptive. For example, UN Resolution
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is the first resolution to
affirm the principle of self-determination, particularly in the context of
decolonization. In addition, UN Resolution 1803 of 14 December 1962
on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources can be seen to
have normative value in several respects."8 Professor Crawford referred
to them as incontrovertible cases of "peoples' rights."3 9 Further, accord-
ing to Brownlie "there is strong evidence in support of the conclusion
that the adoption of resolution 1803 indicated that the principle of com-
pensation was no longer based upon the 'adequate, effective and prompt'
formula of Cordell Hull, but upon the principle of 'appropriate compen-
sation.' "4
Another example of a prescriptive resolution is UN Resolution
2625(XXV) of 24 October 1970 on the Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN. This resolution
is one of the most well acclaimed UN Declarations as an authoritative
statement of some very fundamental principles of international law.
Seven principles were affirmed and clarified: the non-use of force;
peaceful settlement of disputes; self-determination; sovereign equality of
States; the principle of non-intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of
States; the duty of States to cooperate; and the principle of good faith.
According to Jennings and Watts, the "fact that the Declaration was
prepared within the framework of the United Nations after extensive
inter-governmental discussion, and was adopted by acclamation, and
perspective on international law-making which is contrary to the one presented by Professor
Prosper Weil, supra note 4.
37. Pellet, supra note 36, at 32.
38. It is important in the context of the efforts of the United Nations to strengthen the
economic base of the newly independent countries and to affirm their right to choose freely
any political or economic system. This also provided a substantial basis for the nationalization
of several foreign corporations, which until then and during the colonial period owned and
exploited the national resources of the dependent countries for their profit.
39. James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions, in THE RIGHTS OF PEO-
PLES 161, 163 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
40. Ian Brownlie, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,
255 RES. DES COURS. 150 (1995). The Resolution was adopted by 87 votes in favor, 2 against
and 12 abstentions.
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without [a] dissenting vote by the General Assembly, gives the seven
principles contained in it a preeminent value in contemporary
international law."'"
Other UN resolutions with significant prescriptive value include the
definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly,42 the dec-
laration of the international seabed area as the common heritage of
mankind,43 and the preservation of outer space for the common interests
of the international community." The ICJ-in its advisory opinion on the
Certain Expenses of the United Nations45-- declared that the resolutions
of the UN are not merely "hortatory." In the Nicaragua case the ICJ rec-
ognized that opinio juris could be deduced from the circumstances
surrounding the adoption and application of the resolutions of the UN
General Assembly.46 And in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the
Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons it examined a series of UN General
Assembly resolutions on the legality of nuclear weapons for assessing
whether any opinio juris emerged from these resolutions. Although it
could not find such an opinio juris in favor of prohibition of nuclear
weapons, it made a noteworthy observation on the legal value of UN
General Assembly resolutions. The ICJ said that:
The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they
are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can,
in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for estab-
lishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris.
To establish whether this is true of a given General Assembly
resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions
of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris
exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may
show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the
establishment of a new rule.
41. ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 334 (9th
ed., 1992).
42. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 29th Sess., No. 86, at 1 U.N. Doc. A/9890
(1975).
43. Declaration of the Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, U.N. GAOR, 1st
Comm., 25th Sess., No. 25, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1971).
44. The Agreement Governing The Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies (also known as the Moon Treaty), G.A. Res. 68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., No. 48 & 49,
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (1979).
45. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 ICJ 13 (July 20).
46. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), 1986 ICJ 14, 99-100 (June 27).
47. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 32-33, para. 70 (July 8).
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More importantly, in recent years enormous strides have been made
in international law to establish the criminal responsibility of individu-
als, particularly the heads of States, governments, and other senior
functionaries. Further, international criminal tribunals have been given
jurisdiction to try these individuals, irrespective of their official status for
crimes committed against humanity and other war crimes. These trends
are also influencing the national courts to review their own jurisdiction
and competence to allow prosecution of both national and foreign indi-
viduals for such crimes irrespective of the location in which they are
committed or the nationality of the victims. 8 Some domestic tribunals
are now prosecuting criminal acts committed by functionaries of a for-
eign State after they cease to hold their high offices. ' These
developments are powerful testimony to the growing presence of the in-
ternational legal community.
Simultaneously, the right of victims whose human rights were vio-
lated by their own government to appeal to international tribunals
significantly strengthens the concept of international legal community.
The work of UN human rights bodies established with a mandate to
monitor the records of States in the performance of human rights obliga-
tions is also noteworthy for its contribution to consolidate the concept of
the international legal community."
Aside from the prescriptive value of UN resolutions and increasing
international criminal responsibility, the law of State responsibility and
the law of treaties are evolving and mutually reinforcing erga omnes and
jus cogens obligations. The formation and execution or enforcement of
these obligations is directly the product and function of the international
community in its capacity as "an overarching system which embodies a
common interest of all States and, indirectly, of mankind."5' In this sense,
the collective consent of States on the basis of some form of a majori-
tarian principle is the basis for the creation and implementation of
international obligations. In such cases, the will of the international
community supersedes the normal requirement of the formal concur-
rence of wills of States as expressed through reciprocal or bilateral inter-
State relations.52 The concept of international community operates at a
48. M.N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-659 (5th ed., 2003).
49. Id. at 659.
50. Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250
RES. DES CouRas 243 (1994).
51. Tomuschat, supra note 35, at 227.
52. Simma, supra note 50, at 293.
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different level within the system of international law and overrides in the
area of its operation the requirement of State consent.
One should also not underestimate the role of non-traditional sources
of international law that the ICJ and other international tribunals play in
the development of the law. Judicial legislation at the international level
is a well recognized occurrence, albeit within limits of judicial caution
and restraint.' In this regard, international tribunals act as "authoritative
decision-makers expressing community values."55
The expansion of international law in the age of globalization
through formal and informal sources, and the access being granted non-
State actors to international legal procedures and tribunals, as we will
see below, created a functional need to establish more than one interna-
tional tribunal to administer the various legal regimes that it
encompasses. The emergence of international community interest need
not be viewed as the end of the State's pivotal role in building and main-
taining the world public order.6 These changes only mean that the non-
State actors can no longer be denied their due and direct role in shaping
goals and values of the world public order. Even as we recognize this
fact, it is important to remind ourselves that the main edifice for the
structure of the international legal system is and continues to be treaties
that States conclude and ratify. They, together with the customary proc-
ess by which law continues to evolve, play a dominant role in the
codification and progressive development of international law.
III. FUNCTIONAL NEED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS FOR A NEW AGE
Treaties concluded in the last twenty years have consolidated and
expanded diverse fields including the law of the sea, international trade
53. For development of this theme, see Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law,
87 AM. J. INT'L L., 529-551 (1993).
54. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 5 (1982) observed that "Institutions set for the achieve-
ment of definite purposes grow and to fulfill tasks not wholly identical with those which were
in the minds of their authors at the time of their creation." On judicial legislation and judicial
restraint and caution see various chapters of the book.
55. Brownlie, supra note 40, at 29, 45-49 on judicial reasoning and judicial legislation.
56. Simma, supra note 50, at 247 observed that 'bilateralist statal paradigm' has not been
overcome by the actual developments in favor of growing manifestation of the international
community interest According to him to assert to the contrary would 'inevitably lead to an
unrealistic view of the contemporary international relations.' On a different note, emphasizing
the value of treaties along with the recognition that the U.N. Charter is a 'kind of constitution
of the international community for the progressive development and codification of interna-
tional law. See Grigory Tunkin, Is International Law Customary Law Only?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 534, 541 (1994).
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law, human rights, environmental law, and international criminal law.
With the exception of environmental law, these areas of international law
are served by their own special monitoring bodies or tribunals. Each time
a new international tribunal is proposed under any new regime, the need
for its establishment is carefully considered. The creation of a tribunal is
often justified by the special features of the regime it is meant to serve
by way of implementation and development. The State representatives
who lobby for these tribunals are conscious of the need to avoid dupli-
cating the efforts of or supplanting the stature of the ICJ. The ICJ is by
all reasoning not only the premier international law tribunal, but also the
principal judicial organ of the UN. Even though scholars and policy-
makers are cognizant of the ICJ and its preeminent role in the develop-
ment of international law, within the strict bounds of its judicial role, we
cannot ignore the fact that the ICJ-like its predecessor the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ)-is a product of its time.
Further, it is obvious to those familiar with the Statute of the ICJ that
its jurisdiction is open only to States and that it construes its jurisdiction
in strict terms because it is based on the consent of States." The ICJ's
composition is confined to fifteen judges, with persons from the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council routinely being elected;
only a few positions are available to nationals of most of the member
States of the UN. This factor may have had some influence over the de-
cision to establish new tribunals. New tribunals would no doubt open up
opportunities for more nationals to be elected as judges of such interna-
tional tribunals. However, it must be emphasized that this factor is of
limited significance and plays only a secondary role to the functional
need for the establishment of such tribunals. Another stated reason for
the formation of new tribunals is disenchantment with the decisions of
the ICJ,59 but this explanation too is not a significant factor. After all,
57. Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Consistency in Holdings by International Tribunals, in
LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 633, 648 (N. Ando, E. McWhinney & R. Wolfrum
eds., 2002). For a fuller analysis of the status of the ICJ as principal organ and as principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, see SHABTAI ROSENNE, I THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-1996, vol.1, 110-44 (1997). On the relations between
the Court and other tribunals, at p. 142, the author observed that 'This indicates that the Char-
ter implies no formal hierarchical relationship between the different judicial organs
established by or under the auspices of the United Nations, and no limitations upon the power
of the Organization to establish other judicial organs, which shall not, however, be principal
organs in the conception of the Charter.'
58. In Phosphates in Morocco, 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 74, at 23, the court noted that
the jurisdiction (of the court) exists only in the limits within which it has been given and ac-
cepted (by the parties to the dispute).
59. See Oda, supra note 21, at 865; Guillaume, supra note 24, at 854. The disenchantment
of developing countries with the court on account of its decisions in the South-West Africa
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disenchantment with outcomes is not confined to the ICJ or to judicial
tribunals in general; it is a feature common to most permanent institu-
tional bodies. 60
In the ultimate analysis, the functional needs and special features of
the legal regime in question provide the main rationale for the establish-
ment of new tribunals, thanks to the expanding role of the international
legal system. Judge Higgins of the ICJ underlined this policy rationale as
a justification for the creation of the newer and more specialized interna-
tional tribunals. She takes the view that new tribunals are a necessity
because of "certain decentralization of some of the topics with which the
ICJ can in principle deal to new, highly specialized bodies, whose mem-
bers are experts in a subject matter which becomes ever more complex,
which are more open to non-State actors, and which can respond rap-
idly."61 Accordingly, Judge Higgins did not view the creation of new
tribunals as a matter of regret and did not support the call of the past
Presidents of the ICJ for centralization of international law disputes
around the ICJ.
62
The functional requirements of new tribunals can be readily under-
stood if we examine three new international legal regimes that are of
universal interest and scope: the international law of the sea; the interna-
tional law of trade; and the international law of crimes.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE LAW OF THE SEA
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) is com-
prised of twenty-one judges and is now functioning in Hamburg,
Germany. ITLOS has been functioning since October of 1996 and has
already rendered some very important decisions. These decisions gener-
ally involved the prompt release of detained vessels and crews, fishery
management in the exclusive economic zone, flags of convenience, hot
pursuit and espousal of claims relating to crew members not of the na-
tionality of the applicant State, and the issuance of provisional
cases (1962,1966) and the Northern Cameroons case (1963) were mentioned for the estab-
lishment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
60. For example disenchantment with the U.N. on occasion is well known. On the atti-
tudes of States towards the ICJ and other tribunals, see Rosenne, supra note 50, at 178-99.
61. Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting the Sovereign States and the Running a Tight Court-
room, 50 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 121, 122 (2001).
62. Id.
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measures. The decisions of ITLOS and the legal issues they have
opened up appear to put ITLOS in a distinct area of its own control
within the family of international tribunals. As Alan Boyle noted, the
Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) deals with "much that had been in
dispute, much that is new, and much that remains unresolved, it inevita-
bly represents a complex balance of interests, and contains many
inherently uncertain or ambiguous articles."64 For example, before an
application for the prompt release of a vessel and the crew can be enter-
tained, according to Article 292(1) of the LOSC, any court or ITLOS to
which the parties may agree to submit the matter must first be satisfied
that the allegation that the detaining State has not complied with the pro-
visions of the LOSC meet a certain standard of appreciation. 6 Further, as
provided in Article 292(3) of the LOSC, in arriving at its conclusion, and
subsequently while acting upon the application for release, the court or
ITLOS shall deal only with the question of release, without prejudice to
the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic forum against the
vessel or its crew. These questions came up for consideration for the first
time in the M/V Saiga case66 (1997), between St. Vincent Grenadines and
Guinea.67 By a majority vote of twelve to nine, the ITLOS noted that be-
cause they are concerned only with the matter of prompt release of the
vessel and the crew and not with the merits of the allegation, which may
be submitted for consideration of a suitable tribunal or court by the par-
ties separately, the allegation of non-compliance with the provisions of
the LOSC need not be proven, but merely shown "arguable" or "suffi-
ciently plausible. 68 The dissenting judges, however, disagreed with the
majority and wanted a higher threshold of appreciation and held the view
that the allegation must be well-founded as required under Rule 113(1)
of the Rules of the ITLOS.69 In their view, any decision on release of a
63. Shabtai Rosenne, The Case-Law of the ITLOS (1997-2001): An Overview, in CUR-
RENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF
THE SEA 127, 127-28 (Myron H. Nordquist & John N. Moore, eds., 2001).
64. Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea: Problems of Fragmenta-
tion and Jurisdiction, 46 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 37, 38 (1997).
65. For the text of Article 292 (1) of the LOSC, see INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY,
THE LAW OF THE SEA: COMPENDIUM OF BASIC DOCUMENTS, 127 (2001).
66. MV Saiga (Saint Vincent & Grenadines v. Guinea), 1997 ITLOS (December 4) at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html.
67. See E. Lauterpacht, The First Decision of the International Tribunal For the Law of
the Sea: The MV Saiga, in LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN -IN HONOR
OF HIS 80TH BIRTH DAY, 395 (Gerhard Hafner et al. eds., 1998).
68. M/V Saiga, supra note 66, para. 51.
69. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Rules of the Tribunal, U.N. Doc.
ITLOS/8 (2001), at http://www.itlos.org/documents and publications/documents [hereinafter
Rules of the Tribunal]. Rule 113(1) of the Tribunal reads thus: "The Tribunal shall in its
Judgment determine in each case in accordance with article 292 of the Convention whether the
allegations made by the applicant that the detaining State has not complied with a provision of
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vessel and crew is final and binding on the parties to the dispute, and this
is similar to any other claim on a substantive issue under the LOSC.7 °
The standard of appreciation adopted by ITLOS in this case was noted to
be more suitable to a claim on provisional measures (which is covered
by Article 290 of the LOSC) than for the issue of a prompt release of
vessel and crew.7' It is noteworthy that the standard of appreciation of
allegations adopted by ITLOS in the MV Saiga case was abandoned in
the Camouco case (2000), a dispute involving Panama and France.72 By a
majority vote of 19 to 2, ITLOS required that the allegation be "well-
founded" before being entertained, a standard provided for in rule 113(1)
of the Tribunal.73
Other issues could also arise under Article 294 of the LOSC by way
of preliminary hearing. These issues may involve an early stage of pro-
ceedings before the Court or ITLOS to which the dispute under Article
297 of the LOSC could be submitted. This stage occurs even prior to the
stage in which procedural issues, including provisional measures under
Article 290 of the LOSC, may be considered. Under Article 294, the
court or ITLOS would first have to determine whether the complaint
brought before it is prima facie unfounded or abusive of the process of
dispute settlement provided for under the LOSC.74 Even though this pro-
vision is drafted in a neutral manner to apply to complaints brought by
any State--coastal or flag State-this provision is incorporated in the
LOSC to provide some reassurance to coastal States. At the time of ne-
gotiation of the LOSC, coastal States needed assurance that flag States
would not drag them before ITLOS on flimsy grounds whenever they
exercised their enforcement powers within the exclusive economic zone.
According to Rosenne, the burden that Article 294 imposes upon any
court or tribunal is heavy, but when such issues arise before the ICJ as
the competent forum under Article 297, "the question whether the bur-
den is compatible with the Court's powers and functions under the
Charter and Statute may well arise.""
the Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or the crew upon the posting of a reason-
able bond or other financial security is well-founded."
70. See MV Saiga (Anderson, J., dissenting) at paras. 2-5; MN Saiga (Wolfrum, V.P.
and Yamamoto, J., dissenting) at para 5; MV Saiga (Mensah, P., dissenting) at para 5; M/V
Saiga (Park, Nelson, Chandrasekhara Rao, Vukas, and Ndiaye, J., dissenting) at para 8.
71. See MN Saiga (Wolfrum, V.P. and Yamamoto, J., dissenting) at paras 7-8.
72. Camouco (Panama v. France), 2000 ITLOS (February 7) at http://www.itlos.org/
casedocuments/2001/document en_129.doc.
73. Id. at para 49. The dissenting judges however did not question the standard adopted.
74. For a discussion of this aspect of the matter see, Tullio Trevis, Preliminary Proceed-
ings in the Settlement of Disputes under the United nations Law of the Sea Convention: Some
Observations, in Ando, McWhinney & Wolfrum, supra note 57, at 749.
75. Id. at 757, note 13.
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There are other reasons for the creation of ITLOS. ITLOS is open to
entertain disputes involving not only States, but individuals, corpora-
tions, State enterprises, and international organizations.76 As Professor
Sohn pointed out, many disputes might arise between private persons
and the authority established to regulate the international seabed area,
and the ICJ could not be awarded jurisdiction over such disputes accord-
ing to the existing limitations in its Statute.77 On this point, even Judge
Oda, who is concerned about the fragmentation of international law due
to the proliferation of international tribunals, fully supported the creation
of ITLOS to deal with such disputes. In addition, under its Statute,
ITLOS can give an advisory opinion to two or more State parties to any
treaty or agreement related to the purposes of the LOSC, if such treaties
or agreements confer jurisdiction on ITLOS..7 This provision is novel,
because so far only the ICJ, has jurisdiction to give advisory opinions to
state parties to the UN Charter or its specialized agencies.
Moreover, one of the initial principal considerations for creating
ITLOS was to use it as the sole forum to settle all disputes concerning
interpretation and application of the new concept of the common heri-
tage of mankind and thus help a progressive development of the law
governing the international seabed area and its resources. It is certainly
desirable, at least in the formative years, to create a tribunal composed of
judges who are both well-versed in international law as well as experi-
enced in negotiation of the international seabed regime 7 9 It is essential to
remember that during the negotiations of the LOSC, there were con-
spicuous differences between the representatives of the Third World and
the First World about the value, content, and consequences of the con-
cept of the common heritage of mankind, which has been accepted as the
foundation for the legal regime governing the international seabed area
and its resources.80
76. Hugo Caminos, The Creation of Specialized Courts: The Case for the International
Tribunal for Law of the Sea, in Ando et al., supra note 57, at 569-74.
77. See id. at 571.
78. See Rules of the Tribunal, supra note 69, art. 138; P. Chandrasekhara Rao, The Inter-
national Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: An Evaluation, in Ando, McWhinney & Wolfrum
supra note 57, at 667, 669.
79. According to article 191 of the LOS Convention, it is the Seabed Disputes Chamber
"which is competent to give the advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Coun-
cil of the Seabed Authority on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities." This
is one of the seven reasons mentioned by the former President of the ITLOS and Judge P.
Chandrasekhara Rao for highlighting the 'important role and authority' and hence the ration-
ale for the creation of the ITLOS. See Rao, supra note 78, at 668-69.
80. For an analysis of the views and the early development of the concept of common
heritage of mankind, see P.S. RAO, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEAN RESOURCES 76-108
(1975).
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V. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING OF
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
In the past, international trade largely drew its strength from the es-
tablishment of colonial empires that in turn were supported by maritime
military power. Expanding the naval power of the colonial powers in-
volved legal debates about the open and closed seas that eventually
culminated in the doctAine of the freedom of the high seas. This situation
changed with the beginning of decolonization and the renewed call for
sovereign equality and peaceful settlement of all disputes, which the UN
Charter proclaimed as the basic policy of the New World order in 1945."
International trade was eventually organized under the 1947 General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) system." The 1947 GATT was
replaced by the 1994 GAIT system, which has since been incorporated
into the broader international trade regime of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO).83 The present GATT system is rule-based and is subject to a
compulsory settlement of disputes. The current system not only replaced
the earlier system that was essentially sustained by diplomatic and mili-
tary instruments, but it laid a firm foundation for third party dispute
settlement procedures in international relations. The present Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO, unlike its predecessor
contained in the 1947 GATT system, is not a "collection of ad hoc
agreements, panel reports and understandings of the parties."'M This sys-
tem is also not encumbered by the "need to satisfy all parties and can
concentrate on the merits of the dispute and the unencumbered applica-
tion of the facts to WTO law."85 The current dispute settlement
procedures enjoy this advantage because it is a permanent and standing
procedure. The decisions of the WTO Appellate Body are final unless
disapproved by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), an alter ego of the
General Council of the WTO, by consensus. Under the 1947 GATT sys-
tem, decisions were not final unless the GATT Council, consisting of all
16Contracting Parties, approved them by consensus.
81. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2.
82. For an analysis of GATT history, see course prepared by Stephanie Carter, UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCES ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, 3.5 GATT 1994 (2003), at http://www.unctad.org.
83. Id.
84. James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 248,248 (2001).
85. Id. at 249.
86. See the course prepared by Mr. Peter Van den Bossche, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement: World Trade Organization, 3.1, Overview 39, 49
(2003), at http://www.unctad.org.
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The legal work of the WTO-like the work of the earlier panels un-
der the 1947 GATT system-largely resembles the work of
administrative tribunals and other established international tribunals. In
some respects, it also has the features of domestic courts."7 The pleadings
in WTO disputes require inputs from trade specialists and experts on
technical, financial, and economic details before they can be couched in
the legal language of the WTO law. Moreover, Article 3.7 of the DSU
states that the "aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a
positive solution to a dispute" and that "a solution mutually acceptable to
the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is
clearly to be preferred."8 Given the high profile of trade details and the
commercial give-and-take that characterizes the implementation of the
various agreements administered by the WTO, it is not surprising that an
astute observer such as Judge Guillaume wondered whether the DSU
warrants being termed as a "judicial system." 9 But such misgivings are
misplaced given the steady and valuable contribution already made by
the DSU to the principles of compulsory third party dispute settlement in
international relations. The WTO Appellate Body is comprised of both
well-known international law specialists and specialists trained in inter-
national trade law.
No party-including the ardent supporters of the ICJ who view the
ICJ as the apex of international judicial system-would consider the
creation of the DSU of the WTO as anything less than a valuable and
positive addition to the family of international tribunals. This assertion is
amply demonstrated by the fact that the work of the panels and the Ap-
pellate Body of the WTO have acquired sufficient depth, content, and
connectivity to international law. The WTO's jurisprudence is of value
not only to trade specialists, but to public international lawyers as well.
For instance, consider the number of decisions of the Appellate Body,
which deal with the law of treaties, environmental law, human rights,
and State responsibility.9° In fact, some of the more important holdings
that are significant to international law are worth noting.9' First, the Vi-
enna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT) represents the codification
of customary international law and is therefore binding on all States.92
87. Cameron & Gray, supra note 84, at 251.
88. See Van den Bossche, supra note 86, at 42-43.
89. Guillaume, supra note 24, at 860.
90. For a review of the cases of the Appellate Body where rules of general international
law are used for the interpretation of WTO provisions, see JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF
NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 268-72 (2003).
91. Cameron & Gray, supra note 84, at 252-72.
92. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, complaints by the
European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS.8/AB/R, Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS1O/ABIR,
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Second, treaties should be interpreted in good faith and in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of terms in pertinent provisions, keeping in
view the object, purposes, and the overall text of the treaty.93 In addition,
given the various cross-references in each of the agreements to other
WTO agreements, the interpretation of any one of the agreements must
achieve harmony with the terms of the other agreements. 94 It is also es-
tablished that travaux preparatoires is to be regarded as only a
supplementary tool of interpretation in cases where the ordinary mean-
ing of the provision does not resolve the problem of interpretation or to
confirm a textual interpretation.9 These principles of treaty interpretation
are in full conformity with Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT and Article
3:2 of the DSU.96 Third, the decisions of the panel and Appellate Body of
the WTO do not have any precedential effect, but parties can have "rea-
sonable expectations" arising from such decisions and these can be givenS97
appropriate consideration. Similarly, the 1994 GATT is a lex specialis
agreement but it cannot "be read in clinical isolation from public interna-
tional law."9 In considering the relationship between WTO Agreements
and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), one must recognize
that decisions of the panels or Appellate Body of the WTO do not make
pronouncements in a direct fashion. However, the WTO Appellate Body
also enlarged the meaning of "natural resources" in Article XX (g) by
equating the term "renewable natural resources" to include both living
and non-living resources. To make this modification, the Appellate Body
relied on the objective of sustainable development, which the Appellate
Body believed added "color, texture, and shading" to the interpretation
the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS1 /AB/R, Section D on treaty interpretation, WTO Doc.
AB- 1996-2 (adopted Oct. 4, 1996) at 11 [hereinafter Japan-Taxes]. There the Appellate body
also noted that the general rules of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32of the
Vienna Convention on the law of the Treaties have "attained the status of a rule of customary or
general international law."
93. See Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, complaints by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R,
AB-1998-4 (adopted Oct. 12, 1998), at para 114 [hereinafter US-Shrimp].
94. See Appellate Body, Canada--Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, complaint
by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R, AB-1997-2 (adopted June 30, 1997) at
section IV. See also Cameron & Gray, supra note 84, at 257.
95. See Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation of
Certain Poultry Products, complaint by Brazil, WTO Doc. WT/DS69/AB/R, WTO Doc. AB-
199803 (adopted July 13, 1998), at section IV, para 83.
96. Cameron & Gray, supra note 84, at 255, 257.
97. Japan-Taxes, supra note 92, at § 14.
98. See Appellate Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, complaints by Venezuela, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, and Brazil, WTO Doc.
WT/DS4/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (adopted Apr. 29, 1996) at § III, B, 17. See also Cameron & Gray,
supra note 84, at 264.
[Vol. 25:929
Multiple International Judicial Forums
of WTO Agreements. 99 Any conflict between tribunals must be recon-
ciled keeping in view Article 30 of the VCLT, which addresses the effect
of later treaties on former treaties between the same parties. Moreover,
for a WTO member to justify trade restrictions on account of legitimate
societal values and interests such as human, animal and plant life or
health, exhaustible natural resources, national treasures of artistic, his-
toric, archeological value and public morals as exceptions under Article
XX of 1994 GATT, the member is required to exhaust all reasonable op-
tions available to achieve multilateral solutions, taking into consideration
the different conditions that may exist in the exporting countries.'00
Some other points of general legal interest from the work of the
DSU of the WTO may be pertinent for our present examination and are
noted. First, WTO agreements are non-retroactive in nature. Second, the
jurisprudence of WTO dispute settlement is meant to clarify the precise
nature and scope of rights and obligations incorporated in the WTO
Agreements. It has only persuasive value for the subsequent cases.
Within this parameter there has been a continual attempt to prevent
fragmentation since the advent of DSU of WTO as a permanent mecha-
nism. '°0 Third, the DSU neither has the power of judicial legislation that
changes the rights and obligations of the parties to the WTO, nor the role
of authoritatively interpreting the 1994 GATT. This function is reserved
under the WTO system to the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council, where decisions are adopted by a two-thirds majority."2 This
structure differs from the position of the ICJ, which has a prominent role
in the progressive development of international law without the need for
any organs of the United Nations first to adopt its decisions.
However, under the DSU, the decisions of the panels or the appellate
body, like the decisions of the ICJ, lack formal precedential value for
later cases. Nevertheless, they are followed or relied upon unless a good
cause exists to depart from them. This practice of relying upon the pre-
vious decisions without being obliged to adopt them is consistent with
the policy of honoring legitimate expectations that such decisions create
in the interest of predictability and certainty of law.'03 The pattern of
99. US-Shrimp, supra note 93, at § VI, Cl, 155, see also Cameron & Gray, supra note
84, at 267.
100. Cameron & Gray, supra note 84, at 265. For a discussion of the two-tier test (first, the
measure meets the elements of a particular exception and second, the same measure meets the
requirements of the chapeaux of Article XX) to determine whether a measure otherwise GATT
inconsistent could be justified, see Cartier, supra note 82, at 66-69.
101. Cameron & Gray, supra note 84, at 283
102. Id. at 273.
103. Id. at 260-63, 272-76. Judge Shahabuddeen also dealt with this matter in the context
of the work of the International criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and came to the
same conclusion. See Shahabuddeen, supra note 57, at 636.
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decision-making in the DSU is also similar to the ICJ in promoting judi-
cial economy, without totally rejecting the need to be flexible and active
in settling and clarifying the ambiguities in the WTO Agreements.' °' Ac-
cordingly, as noted by the Appellate Body, panels are not required to
answer all the points raised by the parties, but only to address those
questions that are necessary for resolving the claim, and to the extent
necessary for reasoned consideration of the claims asserted.05 Claims not
asserted, or exceptions not pleaded, need not be addressed.'°6 To avoid
conflicts with the policies and objectives of other multilateral economic
institutions like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment or the International Monetary Fund, the WTO Appellate Body also
narrowly defines its obligations under WTO agreements. 7
There are also some key differences between the ICJ and DSU of the
WTO in the settlement of disputes. In the case of the ICJ, third parties
can intervene in the case before the court if they can convince the court
that they have an interest of a legal nature that is likely to be affected by
the decision. In practice, the ICJ will rarely allow a third party interven-
tion.' 8 On the other hand, Article 10 and Appendix 3 of the DSU permit
third parties an opportunity to be heard and to make written submissions;
they can also make oral submissions. For example, in the EC-Banana
case there were six parties (including the European Commission (EC)),
which represented 15 States and 20 third parties. The Appellate Body in
the EC-Banana case clarified that a State could seek the establishment
of a panel even if did not have a legal interest or could not show an ac-
tual trade impact.' °9 The interest in ensuring free international trade in
goods and services, as well as the interest in clearly determining rights
104. Cameron & Gray, supra note 84, at 258, 281-83. The need to engage in the judicial
economy without neglecting the proper function of a court to clarify and advance the devel-
opment of law, thus engage in some cautious form of judicial activism is common in the
practice of the International Court of Justice. See Lauterpacht, supra note 54; see also Hugh
Thirlway, Judicial Activism and the International Court of Justice, in Ando, et al., supra note
57, at 77-105.
105. See the course prepared by Peter Van den Bossche, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement: World Trade Organization, 3.2, Panels 15
(2003), at http://www.unctad.org.
106. See Appellate Body, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses, complaint by India, WTO Doc. WT/DS33/AB/R, AB-1997-1 (adopted
Apr. 27, 1997) at § VI, 21; see also Cameron & Gray, supra note 87, at 282.
107. Id. at 270.
108. See the course prepared by P.S. Rao, United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment, Dispute Settlement: World Trade Organization, 1.2, General Topics 19 (2003) at
http://www.unctad.org.
109. Appellate Body, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Dis-
tribution of Bananas, complaints by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United
States, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R, AB-1997-3 (adopted Sept. 9, 1997); see also Cameron &
Gray, supra note 87, at 288; Van den Bossche, supra note 105, at 35.
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and obligations under the WTO Agreement, provide sufficient grounds to
pursue WTO dispute settlement." However, the difference between the
ICJ and the DSU in allowing third party intervention is a difference of a
procedural nature and is otherwise justified by the specialized character
of the legal regime to which the DSU is organically linked.
This analysis of the jurisprudence of the WTO dispute settlement
system reveals that even though the WTO agreements have been consti-
tuted as a self-contained regime, general principles of international law,
particularly those pertaining to international treaty interpretation provide
a necessary basis for the application and implementation of that regime.
The evolving process thus adds strength to the international legal system
without affecting the unity and integrity of international law.
VI. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
The initial creation of ad hoc criminal courts, and more recently,
permanent international criminal courts, has opened up possibilities for
the interpretation and application of international law through special-
ized forums. These tribunals were created because the UN Security
Council saw the need to prosecute and punish persons committing war
crimes and crimes against humanity, not only as a necessary measure of
justice, but also as an important means for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. These tribunals are open for the trial of
individuals, as opposed to States, for committing crimes as defined un-
der the respective tribunal's statute. Following the principle of individual
criminal responsibility, the Rome Statute established a permanent inter-
national criminal court. The added justification for the permanent
international criminal court is that it would better meet the goal of justice
than the system of ad hoc international criminal courts, which smack of
victor's justice. " '
These international tribunals are essentially trial courts. Their main
work revolves around the weighing of evidence, claims concerning the
burden of proof, the admissibility of evidence given by witnesses and
experts, and the typical procedures of interrogation and cross-
examination. This work is special and should not be equated with the
procedures and proceedings before any other international tribunals, par-
ticularly the ICJ. This, however, does not relieve these tribunals, as
110. Cameron & Gray, supra note 87, at 289.
111. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International
Criminal Court in the New World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992); see also P.S.
Rao, Trends in International Criminal Jurisdiction, in M. S. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AT 50
AND BEYOND 67 n.1 (1996).
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Judge Shahabuddeen emphasized, from the duty to correctly apply cus-
tomary international law and any relevant treaty law, including the
Statute establishing the tribunal and the crimes defined therein." 2 In fact,
Judge Shahabuddeen makes two important points. First, he notes the
need for the international criminal tribunals established by or under the
auspices of the UN to correctly apply international law whenever the
subject matter under their consideration demands it." 3 Second, when
pronouncing what the international law "is" in a particular case, these
tribunals should be conscious of the desirability of achieving consistency
within the same system. Further, in pursuance of the duty to maintain
consistency, the tribunals should show deference to the holdings of the
ICJ, even if they are not by law bound by the ICJ's decisions. Judge
Shahabuddeen noted that the ICJ is not only a premier legal body within
the family of the United Nations, but is also a principal (judicial) organ
of the UN."
4
A question arose concerning the decision of the Tadic case" 5 (1999),
decided by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), regarding whether it correctly appreci-
ated the applicable principle of international law. This question was on
the issue of attribution of responsibility to the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (FRY) for acts committed by the Bosnian Serb Army in the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Trial Chamber of the ICTY,
earlier relying upon the holding of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, con-
cluded that they could not be so attributed to the FRY. This decision was
made on the ground that no "dependency and control" could be shown to
exist between the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) and the FRY such that the
former could be considered an organ of the latter.' 6 In addition, it noted
that in the absence of proof that the BSA acted as an agent of the FRY,
"effective control" by the latter must be shown for specific unlawful acts
of the former to be attributable to the FRY.' '7
In the Nicaragua case, it may be recalled, the ICJ declined to attrib-
ute to the United States the acts of the Contras, a rebel group fighting to
overthrow the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. The ICJ held that
the test of "dependency and control" could not be shown between the
contras and the United States to equate the Contras, for legal purposes,
with an organ of the Untied States, or to establish that they were acting
112. On this duty of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, see Sha-
habuddeen, supra note 57, at 643.
113. Id. at648.
114. Id.
115. Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 27.
116. See de Hoogh, supra note 28, at 262.
117. Id. at 280.
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on behalf of that government."8 Further, it held that in the absence of that
equation, to create responsibility, the United States should have exer-
cised "effective control" with respect to the specific operation "in the
course of which the alleged violations were committed.'" 9
Reversing the decision of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber of
the ICTY was not persuaded by the reasoning of the ICJ in the Nicaragua
case.12 It held that the Nicaragua requirement, of acting under specific
instructions, could be applied only in relation to a specific act of a single
individual or an unorganized group of individuals. 2 ' However, it stated
that:
In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group
to State, it must be proved that the State wields overall control
over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group,
but also by co-coordinating or helping in the general planning of
its military activity.... However it is not necessary that, in addi-
tion, the State should also issue, either to the head or to members
of the group, instructions for the commission of specific acts
contrary to international law.'1
2
This holding of the Appeals Chamber of ICTY raised a concern from the
perspective of maintaining the unity and integrity of international law.'23
An examination of the holding of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in
the Tadic case is beyond the scope of this presentation. But in so far as
the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case distinguished itself from the ICJ
in the Nicaragua case on the basis of material facts, the danger of frag-
mentation or the chance of lack of consistency may not be as real as
feared.
125
In any case, it is possible that persons of integrity in their own wis-
dom could honestly differ on the interpretation and application of
international law in a given case on a similar, but not necessarily identi-
cal, set of facts. These disagreements are evident when judges of the
same court disagree and enter dissenting or separate opinions. They are
also visible when the same court overturns its own previous position
118. Id. at 269.
119. Id. at 280 n.130.
120. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 1, at 565.
121. de Hoogh, supra note 28, at 263.
122. Id. In adopting the criterion of overall control, the Appeals chamber appeared to fol-
low the test adopted by European Court of Human rights in the Loizidou case, eventhough the
test used there is 'effective overall control.' See id. at 272.
123. For the concern of President Guillaume, see Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 1, at
555, and for the expression of concern of Judge Shahabuddeen, supra note 57, at 649.
124. For such an examination, see de Hoogh, supra note 28.
125. Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 27, at paras. 115-45.
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with a majority supporting a new proposition. Disagreements are also
unavoidable between different international forums given the particular
features and the specialized interests of the legal regime that the tribu-
nals are required to implement in specific cases. Inevitable
disagreements may be considered healthy, as long as these relate to dif-
ferences in perception about the applicable principles and exceptions
that apply within the same system. The choices preferred under one re-
gime might not be the same for all decision-makers, and the same
decision-maker might not prefer the same choice if the circumstances or
context changes. There is also the possibility for distinguishing one
claim or situation from another and for discarding previous holdings and
adopting new decisions by adducing cogent reasons in the interest of
justice. Disagreements of this nature need not be viewed as threats to the
unity and integrity of international law. As Judge Shahabuddeen himself
observed, in this task the decision maker is assisted by viewing the sys-
tem as whole and appreciating that "these are not separate and
independent rules, but single rules subject to qualifications imposed by
the same system."'
' 26
It has been asserted that international law, like any legal system, is
full of normative ambiguity. Accordingly,
[T]he great ambiguity of the constituent technical terms in the
principal prescriptions and the wide variety of authoritative pol-
icy sources accorded to the authorized decision-makers have
given, and continue to give, to such decision-makers, a very
large discretion to adjust particular controversies in terms of the
127
multiple variables peculiar to each controversy....
VII. MULTIPLICITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: A SIGN OF
MATURITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
Apart from the major dispute settlement systems, there are other in-
ternational judicial tribunals, which are established-or likely to be
established-in a regional context such as Europe, Latin America, and
Africa. In addition, national tribunals are also a forum for interpretation
and application of international law, including the interpretation of nu-
merous treaties in the new era of the globalization of human rights,
international trade, and environmental law. But the work of these tribu-
126. Shahabuddeen, supra note 57, at 635.
127. McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Tests for Secu-
rity, reprinted in McDOUGAL & REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 9, 14 (1981).
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nals-both national and regional-poses less of a problem for the unity
and integrity of international law for several reasons. First, they are fo-
rums, which do not operate at the same universal level as international
tribunals like the ICJ, ITLOS, or the DSU of the WTO. Hence, rarely is
there any conflict in the working of these national and international tri-
bunals. Second, in most cases these tribunals are quite conscious of the
need to align their jurisprudence with the well-established norms of in-
ternational law, particularly in the field of human rights and
environmental law. In fact, it is through the decisions of the national and
regional tribunals that we are witnessing a progressive development and
application of international standards. These tribunals for the most part
act more as agents and instruments for the unity and integrity of interna-
tional law than as sources of its fragmentation.
Jonathan Charney reviewed the work of different international law
tribunals and their impact on select areas of international law as part of
his Hague lecture. '28 One finding of his analysis is that "in several core
areas of international law the different international tribunals of the late
twentieth century do share a coherent understanding of that law."'29
Further, although "differences exist, these tribunals are clearly engaged
in the same dialectic."'3 Charney was conscious that in the absence of a
hierarchical system, complete uniformity of decisions of various
tribunals was not possible. Yet, he noted that "it is clear that the
continuing specialized tribunals tend to follow the reasoning of their
prior decisions."' 3 ' Furthermore, "the views of the ICJ, when on point,
are given considerable weight and those of other international tribunals
are often considered."'32 In fact, Charney sees a certain advantage in the
lack of a strict hierarchical system because it provides opportunity for
experimentation and creativity.'33 Thus, various tribunals can collectively
contribute to the development of international law.
'34
George Abi-Saab makes the same point and is perhaps even more
positive about the emergence of the multitude of international tribu-
nals. 35 Abi-Saab argues that as things become more complex, the scope
of international law will continue to increase the number of these tribu-
nals, "reflect[ing] a higher degree of division of labor, or specialization,
128. Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened By Multiple International Law
Tribunals?, 271 RES. DES COURS 101 (1998).
129. Id. at 347.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. George Abi-Saab, Fragmentation Or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 919 (1999).
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which is a higher stage of evolution."' 36 Like Shahabuddeen, however,
Abi-Saab cautioned that it is important to maintain a proper balance
among the holdings of different tribunals.137 For this balance to be
achieved, he suggests that the judges of these diverse tribunals must al-
ways be mindful of the functioning of "the overarching principles that
sustain its normative edifice and keep it together."'' 38 He urges that the tri-
bunals should strive for the emergence and hardening of an international
judicial system.39 The ICJ, in his opinion, could play a pivotal role in
this effort by earning a status of primus inter pares, which then would be
followed "not out of legal compulsion, but through recognition of and
deference to its intrinsic authority and the quality of its legal reasoning
and findings."'
40
VIII. DIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: A REFLECTION
OF THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE UNITY AND
INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The creation of these tribunals is never an easy matter, but in almost
every case States establish them when the need is clear and justified. 141
All new tribunals require an additional allocation of financial resource
and infrastructure, and they also compete with other parts of the interna-
tional machinery also established under these new international regimes
committed to the common cause of the international community. How-
ever, it is a sign of maturity and growing importance of the rule of law in
international affairs that international machinery and an appropriate ju-
dicial system also accompany the creation of any new and
comprehensive international legal regime. 42 The judicial enforcement of
international rights and obligations reduces arbitrariness and power plays
in international relations.
Simultaneously, tribunals enhance respect for universal legal order.
Judicial tribunals composed of international legal experts-but with spe-
136. Id. at 925.
137. Id. at 926; see also Shahabuddeen, supra note 126.
138. Abi-Saab, supra note 135.
139. Id. at929.
140. Id.
141. On this point, see Charney, supra note 128, at 124-25. Judge Rosalyn Higgins also is
of the same view. See supra note 61, at 122.
142. Professor and now Judge Bruno Simma is particularly concerned and critical that in
many instances States set forth new legal regimes without investing them with adequate inter-
national infrastructure to be fully effective and non-discriminatory. He says that "there is
indeed reason to be concerned about new conceptions being grafted upon universal interna-
tional law without support though, and serious attempt at, adequate institution building."
Simma, supra note 50, at 249.
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cialists in the particular field of law itself-would not merely settle dis-
putes on a case by case basis, but in doing so would help develop the
nascent legal regime into a full blown branch of international law. It is
also important to bear in mind that comprehensive and virtually "self-
contained regimes" have their own dynamics and special features, and to
be successful the dispute settlement mechanism must be cognizant of
these features. Hence, there is ample opportunity for the system of inter-
national law to branch out and to gain strength with multiple judicial
tribunals that are vested with the charge of nurturing specific areas of
international legal landscape. The important caveat, however, is that
judges of these diverse tribunals, when they apply and interpret rights
and obligations under international law, should be conscious of the over-
arching international judicial system that is emerging, which they should
creatively and energetically promote. Furthermore, judges must show
good faith and exhibit respect, not only to their own previous holdings
on a subject, but should show equal respect to the relevant holdings of
other international tribunals in the interest of judicial harmony, certainty,
and the predictability of law. In this respect judicial restraint and econ-
omy should play just as important a role as judicial activism plays to
help bridge gaps in law. The ultimate justification for the existence of a
diversity of international tribunals is to achieve unity of the international
legal system, which is dedicated to justice and equity in international
relations.
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